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favorite subject, both because I enjoy the technical issues, and because it's
the most important one that I know of. We have a system that is absolutely
wonderful [at] producing medicines and treatments and vaccines for certain
diseases of importance to certain of us in the developed world, and
absolutely lousy for producing products for anything else. And the patent
system plays a role in this. Finance plays a role in it, most of all. Our
understanding [and] what we are trying to do in health care plays a role in
it, but it certainly, in my mind, is one of the most important problems we
have.
We have an absolutely wonderful panel and I'm not going to take
significant time [with] the introductions. I assume you all have the
biographies, don't you? I'm not going to take significant time [with] the
introductions, simply to give the speakers more time and give more time
for questions; because I have been very nasty to them about how long I'll
give them and about speaking over the time limit and all that. So let me
begin then initially with Steve Maurer, Lecturer in Public Policy at U.C.
Berkley, who will give us our first presentation.
MR. MAURER: Well, that's the hardest part of the talk ....
So
indeed, we have this problem that we do very well at [providing] medicines
for the first world, and we have Intellectual Property ["IP"] to thank for
that. What are we doing wrong elsewhere and can we tinker with it? Very
quickly, the point of the talk is I'm going to review for you that IP has costs
as well as benefits. These are very well known. You can quote Jefferson to
this effect, and their powerful generalizations that the economists have
done on IP's costs and benefits and when it's the best tool in the 2 0 th
century. The third world is a very peculiar environment for IP. A lot of the
usual assumptions don't work very well. We'll review that. And then I'll
talk about proposals that mostly economists have made to improve the
system. This is an outgrowth of the fact that they've built all sorts of
elaborate models about how to improve IP itself. But, this is a special class
of models tailored for the third world. And finally, I'm going to ask is this
task hopeless? Would it be better just to do something with a non-IP
model? And I'm not going to decide that, but I think there's a reasonable
question there.
First of all, just to review, the man in the street basically thinks that
the problem with monopoly is that it makes the man in the comer there
rich. That's not a very appealing view to an economist because in theory
you could tax Bill Gates and put his money back in the economy and
everything would be fine. That doesn't happen in life, but it happens in
theory so they don't worry about that. They say that's just a distributional
issue. What they really care about is that monopolies are inefficient. And
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they mean inefficient in the special sense that, is it possible that if we
rearrange the economy, Bill Gates would be no worse off and other people
would be better off? In that sense, the economy is inefficient if everybody
could be at least as well off and somebody's life could be improved. And
this is the only graph I'll show you, but it's worth looking at. A is the socalled market solution, where a lot of people buy the product at a cheap
price. B is what a monopolist would impose. A patent gives you the power
to do a monopoly. And the thing labeled "dead weight loss," economists
come up with such lovely transparent definitions, are the number of people
who are deprived of the product because it's priced at B instead of A. The
one thing I want you to notice about this graphically, and then I'll stop, is
that it depends on the flatness of the demand curve. If this is a very steep
curve, dead weight loss is small, but if you have flat curves, like you do in
the third world, like you do if the global economy has both lots of poor
people and lots of rich people, dead weight loss becomes an important
drawback to using IP.
So, what's good about IP? What's good about IP is it gives people
outside the government who have information that the government doesn't
have, incentive to use their information in picking the next research project.
And the two classic kinds of information that people may hold is, first of
all, we don't know that all products are something we'd even want-that if
I built this thing the market would come. It's usually not a problem for
medicine, but I... imagine a Bob Newhart skit in which the Botox people
go to a venture capitalist and say, look this stuff will paralyze your face and
people are going to buy it like crazy.
(LAUGHTER)
I would've wondered. I'm not that smart in prospect. I knew in
hindsight it was a great product. Scientific risk is what you're usually
worried about in this category. Nixon announced a disastrous war on
cancer in the 70's on the theory that [it] was like the Manhattan Project. If
we only threw enough money [at] it, we were just about there. But there
was no real judgment about where to get started. Everybody had a pet
judgment. There was no obvious consensus that this is the thing that we
need to do, and so we spent a lot of money and we still have cancer. At the
other end of the extreme, we have gene sequencing. Leroy Hood built this
machine that sequences genes and if you decide that a particular
chromosome is something that you'd like the intellectual property on, you
basically set their machine running and go home. Now I'm sure that's an
insult to the biologist, but it's a good 30,000 foot view of the system.
Alright, what's strange about the third world from the point of view of
engineering IP? First of all, there's no money in Africa, right? Normally IP
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gives consumers a vote-that's the great thing. In Africa, by some
estimates, the amount of medical care that is needed in sub-Saharan Africa
per capita exceeds the gross domestic product per capita south of the
Sahara. There aren't enough people to have the votes to say, "yes, we need
these third world medicines." That's the very simplistic reason why IP
doesn't work in an unaltered form. The second reason is there's not enough
money in Washington. We consistently under-fund third world budgets by
very paltry amounts, and the recent Bush speech gives people some hope,
so maybe there's news in that. But we're always going to live in a world
where Washington is under-funding this in terms of you know, you sort of
look at the paper, and go, geez, why don't we spend 1350 a head to do what
we should, which is what these numbers typically come out to. And finally,
as I've already mentioned, in the West, demand is very inelastic, very steep
at the demand curves. Why? Because we're all insured, and it's like, sure,
give me the best drug. That's not true in the third world.
Okay. So there [are] two types of diseases to begin here. One is, there
are diseases that have a presence in the West, and those we're very good at
developing cures for. And can the free world sort of free ride? The third
world has between half and two percent of the world pharmaceutical
markets. If they free ride, nothing happens basically to first order ... the
incentives of the drug companies. So what we want to do is set things up so
they can get access to it, but we don't interfere with the markets in the first
world which is what's driving the innovation machine from a patent
standpoint. There's been a suggestion by Patricia Danzon, that, you know,
TRIPS [Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights]' allows
parallel imports.2 We ought to have a rule so that you don't have a lot of
imports going back and forth between the third world and the first world.
Why? Because that will drive third world prices to first world prices-bad
idea. John Barton, I'll let him talk to that, has said, you know, we need to
have to tiered pricing in the third world. There have been various articles
like that. And finally, Jean Lanjouw has kind of a cute paper, that says
when you ask the U.S. Patent Office for a license to file for patents abroad,
you need to promise them that you won't use it to purchase-to shut down
third world drug companies.3 And if you promise that, then basically what

1. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
2. See Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals:
Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents, AEI Brookings Joint Center (2003), available at
http://aei-brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/phpng.pdf"
3. Jean Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: U.S. and International Legal
Issues, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2002).
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you do is you give up having your patents in the underdeveloped world and
you only have it in the first world or visa-a-versa. Okay.
There's some good things that are coming out. Pharmacia recently
made a deal that said look, if you produce my drugs in a different shape
and color that makes it harder to ship it back to the first world. I'll let you
use it in the third world.
Right now drug prices are pretty low-90 to 97 percent off in Africa.
And there's even a recent paper that was quite controversial that says
maybe patents don't matter. A lot of drugs are not patented in a lot of
African countries. The problem is that a lot of this exists because there's
basically no money for drugs in any case. If we start solving the problem
and there's serious money for drugs in Africa, maybe people will start
patenting. Maybe prices will rise.
The real peculiar problem is tropical diseases. [That is] about half or a
little more than half of the total problem, if you're saying let's save
peoples' lives. And there are various proposals that have come out in order
to [determine whether] we [can] make the invention machine work for the
third world? And they all involve the first world putting up money to
simulate third world demand, because there isn't any money in the third
world. One is you'd have a prize for the guy who comes up for a malaria
vaccine. Another one is you could have a fund that promises in the future if
you build a malaria vaccine, we'll pay for it. We'll buy so many thousand
at such a price, so many million at such a price. There's the defend
proposal: We'll buy a license for the third world. The first world will
continue to have high prices but we'll buy a low price license for the third
world. And finally, there's kind of a cute thing from a WHO [World Health
Organization] official that says, look, we'll give you an extension on your
first world drugs that you really are making money off of, if you'll give the
third world drug away for free. All of these things have both an economic
component, which I think you understand now, but also political
component that they usually more or less explicitly involve hiding the price
from Congress. And as I say, so these figures give you some sense of just
how far apart things are. But there's some reason to be a little bit cheerful
that Congress will put up some money in light of the Bush initiative,4 and
so the question is, where are we?
If you want the absolute cheapest solution, IP has this built-in
monopoly. It brings me back to the uncool version of what's wrong with
monopoly. It raises prices. If you want the absolute cheapest solution, you
4. See President Bush's AIDS Initiative, Foreign Press Center Briefing, U.S. Department of
State (Feb. 6, 2003), at http://fpc.state.gov/17497.htrn
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should not give out an IP monopoly. You should pay people to do the
research. Pay somebody in the National Lab to do it. And in fact, if it turns
out that IP will always be more than what Bush is willing to write a check
for, I would say, hey, let's go to the National Labs and have them do this
project. When I talk to people in the labs who say look, we can come up
with the targets, we can come up with the chemicals. We can't do trials, but
you can pay the drug companies by the hour to do trials. So, is this a
sensible thing? Should we opt out of IP? There are stories both ways. One
story is, USAID had a horrible scandal in the '80s that involved both sides
of the transaction sleeping with each other and they have tried three malaria
vaccines, none of which worked-utter disaster, waste of money. On the
other hand, there's the polio example. In the 1950's, March of Dimes paid
two million dollars to researchers. They came up with a vaccine, and there
was no intellectual property on it. The pharmaceutical companies got into
trials. They did it at cost and very successful. Something we're very proud
of. So this can be done. And given that it's such a marginal case to use IP,
if we can't hide the budget figure from Congress, we got to pony-up, then I
think we need to get out of the IP game. And that's it.
MR. BARTON: Thank you very much for an excellent introduction.
Let's turn from the broader level to the more IP oriented level with Mr.
Harinder Sikka, Senior President for Corporate Affairs of Nicholas
Piramal, India Limited. I'll turn it over to you.
MR. SIKKA: Thank you very much, John. I will cover most of
India's concern or developing nations concern on the recent TRIPS that has
been blocked about the compulsory licensing and the issues concerned
thereof, black marketing concerns which have been raised left and right, the
solutions thereof as far as a developed nation is concerned, from the
differential point of view, differential pricing, as well as through research
and development. Let me come to-straight away to, most countries,
developed countries believe that TRIPS talks about a particular disease or a
set of diseases. The U.S. has said that there are so many numbers of
infectious diseases that it should be incorporated and no more. TRIPS does
not talk about a particular disease. It talks about health care as a whole. It
also does not define a national emergency. As per India, it is left to each
country to decide which way to go about it and how best to go about it. The
main aim of TRIPS in public health care is to provide the technology, is to
provide a life saving drug to each human in a poor country. And in its
present form, TRIPS does not support technology transfer. It at best favors
IPR. One of the chief reasons of why developing countries are feeling the
pinch is that developed countries have strong infrastructure. They have
insurance coverage. They can afford higher medicines and higher cost
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medicines, but poor countries can barely have that kind of arrangement.
This is another irony. Multinationals generate over 80 percent of the
revenue from sales from the developed markets. Almost the entire research
is focused on the diseases that are done in the developed world. In 1998,
$70 billion was spent, out of which only $3 million was dedicated to HIV
and AIDS, only $100 million to malaria. Between '75 and '96, in about 20
years, over 1200 new drugs were developed, out of which only 13 were
developed to treat tropical diseases and 4 were the direct results of farmer.
What did the World Bank have to say? It says what Dr. Barton in his
phenomenal report has brought out that TRIPS enhances the value of
patents. It provides more muscle to a developed country, and in the end, a
developing nation remains a net loser. As a result, the U.S. benefits have
gone across over $19 billion annually. Royalties have increased from $14
billion to $22 billion. And there are good reasons to believe that TRIPS in
its present form protects commercial investments and interests and not
public interests. India, since the 70's, has been following process patenttith
the result that we have been able to bring about 25,000 small and big
manufacturers producing about $2.5 billion worth of drugs. Post January
2005, the majority of them will come under severe threat, and this is likely
to lead to enormous demand and supply situations. Can India afford such a
scenario? Can any developing country afford such a scenario? Compulsory
license is but a small hope.
Why compulsory licensing? Child pneumonia kills millions of
children each year, but the drug Erythromycin is priced so highly that a
developing nation in Sahara, in the sub-Saharan areas, cannot simply afford
it. India produces that drug at one-fifth of the cost, the generic version. But
it cannot afford to export it due to the rigid patent laws. Compare this to the
U.S. for example. Post 9/11, U.S. almost issued a compulsory license for
Cipro. To date, U.S. has put exorbitant duty on the seal, on the U.S. seal, to
protect its domestic market. In the 50's and 60's, the U.S. was the highest
user of compulsory licenses. India has, to date, not used any. It is therefore
of vital importance that developing countries must be allowed to come up
with a pro-competitive solution for patented drugs that insure the
availability of medicines at low cost. And there are black market concerns,
of course, and this will happen at all times. Why? TRIPS grants 20 years
patent protection for new drugs. That, in turn, delays inexpensive research
in generic area. When medicines are very highly priced, cheaper
substitutions will find their way into black market as perhaps one of the
simplest. And while it is a nightmare for a manufacturer, it's a blessing in
disguise for the consumer. In the context of a national emergency,
therefore, it is the availability of the low priced drugs, and not the color of
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the market, that plays a role. Try and see these poor countries and how they
manage without insurance, buy those life saving drugs and the rock that
they go through. It is definitely appreciated that R&D ["Research and
Development"] should be paid for. But more often than not, eminencies
rule the earth on the R&D, and would like to take their profit back very
quickly. One has to see how much quickly. Differential pricing is one of
the solutions that we think can come in. And it has been practiced in India
in a big way. There are two methods, short and long. And both need to be
worked simultaneously. In Canada, price controls are used to limit price
increase of patented drugs. In India, differential pricing has been
successfully used in areas of power supply, agriculture, and telecom. Since
major income is generated from developed countries, developing countries
should be allowed to produce life saving drugs using compulsory license
with direct restriction on export to the developed world. I'll give an
example. My company, Eckward Hoffman LaRoche's Indian Operations,
inherited a drug called Bactrim. We sell it at one-fifth of the cost within
India and do not export it. And to Washington, it doesn't make a difference
because it's not their chief, but it saves quite a lot of people in our own
country. Johnson & Johnson, on the other hand, sells within India, a drug at
10 times the cost, and it still survives. It's doing a roaring business. People
who like brand and can afford quality of that brand, they go about it
nevertheless.
R&D is another solution. We believe, you know, to pay to work class
centers in countries that have intelligence capacity to deliver. To find
already existing pricing instilled in public institutions in developing
countries that have a successful track record, and whose performance could
be bolstered with additional and directed funding. To create global
knowledge network and with partnership between public and the private.
But other than using spare and expensive capacity of large multinationals,
it would be more productive to create drugs for the poor, using the capacity
of the countries which are economically poor but intellectually rich,
[getting] commitments to insure open access to a scientific database and
commitments to insure that the benefits to public funding and research are
available to all.
While I am talking about these issues, in most developing countries
right now, there is a phenomenal amount of crisis because of TRIPS. What
is going to happen in the end of the day? And while a developed nationwhile a developed country can have too many areas to look around, a
developing nation which is struggling to protect its people, trying to
provide them with medical health care, is going to find it even more
difficult. I'll give you a small example before I conclude. In India, we have

2004]

CHALLENGES FOR THE BIOTECH INDUSTRY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

9

people talented who have produced phenomenal results. We have launched
ASLVs 5 and GSLVs, 6 and jurisdictionally launched vehicles at virtually
$43 million, which is one-tenth of General Electric's research budget. Yet
we produced this kind of result. [What] the government of India can at least
do is to protect or provide health care. It is of importance to developing
countries, therefore, to address these issues and have the developed nations
address them in adamant seriousness. Thank you very much.
MR. BARTON: Thank you. Let's turn now to(CLAPPING)
MR. BARTON: To further exploration of the patent issues with Dr.
Herwig von Morze.
DR. VON MORZE: I should say that I don't have a reservation
about handouts in the third world so if anybody is interested and if my
observations turn out to be unintelligible at least you will be able to read
them. I would like to first explain my bias. Obviously, I worked for 27
years in the pharmaceutical industry, so I'm of the old fashioned belief that
patents are really of the essence for the economic welfare of any nation. I'd
like to address the issue as the first issue, the access of essential medicines
in the developing world and the clash that is perceived and was addressed
by the speakers before between access on the one hand and the need to
innovate and the need to have patent protection [on the other].
First, a very basic question should be asked. Does this clash in reality
exist? And I also want to differentiate. I don't think we can put developing
countries all in one pot. I'd like to look at developing countries in the subSaharan, Africa, and then much more developed countries, India, Brazil, to
a certain extent South Africa also. Amir Alteran of the Harvard Center for
International Development has done a study. And he was investigating the
question whether the patent system really prevents generic competition,
keeps the prices high, and nobody gets treatment. And I need to say, I don't
approach this issue in any way lightly. The old Romans got it right. It's
"tour race aquitur," which means, you know, it's my problem, it's our
problem, and it's the world's problem. So it's a very essential point. And I
don't think that pharmaceutical companies look at that in a very light
fashion-light-fashioned way.
Let's look at the sub-Saharan African countries, and the issue of
AIDS there, which is sort of a critical issue there. There currently are 15

5. Advanced Satellite Launch Vehicle; this vehicle is a booster that places satellites into

orbit.
6. Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle; this vehicle places satellites into orbit and was
a part of the Indian Space Program.
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AIDS drugs, retrovirals available, and the issue is, does the patent system,
or do existing patents prevent that? No, because no patents exist in these
countries for these-I mean, in free countries patents exist and they cover
certain products but not in the 53 countries that are there. Then, obviously,
the patent system, one would expect that in countries like Mozambique,
since there are no patents, there would be adequate treatment. No, of course
not. And I think my colleague before had said, and that's quite correct,
there is no money. That's part of the problem. But beyond the issue of
money, it's a question that the rich countries, who one would expect would
donate more money, they don't really do very much. I mean, for example,
the statistics prove that England does relatively, is relatively generous with
$147 million, but Germany only offers like $3 million, Japan $4 million. I
mean, those are things that are really astounding considering that Bill
Gates, himself, for the various the projects spends $150 million, and that's
a real ...

contrast that is somewhat frightening. Beyond money, what else

prevents access to health care there? That's clearly that there is no health
care system in place, a health care infrastructure, because it's not just-it's
too simple to say it's the price of the drugs that prevents it. The price of the
drug is one factor, but the other factor is you have to have educated
physicians, you have to have hospitals. You have, even as simple as that,
you have to have roads to get patients to hospital and to get patients to
doctors. And that it is calculated that about for each drug or treatment in the
AIDS area, you need about $100 per patient per year. And the, what these
countries can afford is in the $10 or $20 per patient per year at the
maximum. And so that's, in other words, it's a fallacy to say that in these
countries the patent system prevents access to medicines.
Now, let's look at India, Brazil, and South Africa. The situation is
quite different there. Patents do exist with varying condition periods and
varying enforceability. India just introduced new legislation in 2002, and
after having some initial legislation in 1999, there is some adaptation to
TRIPS. For example, the term was extended to 20 years, now. However, it
began, it's a fallacy to say that these 20 years are at the disposal of the
pharmaceutical company if one considers that the research and
development takes about 10 to 12 years. Those are proven statistics that
exist for the U.S., for Europe, and a number of countries. Therefore, a
number of countries have recognized that the 20-year term is really
misleading. It's at best 8 to 10 years. Now, India has in the patent law
provided for other things that basically detract from patent enforceability,
and compulsory licenses being one of them. Now, compulsory licenses is
often focused on local manufacturer-that is, if you do not manufacturer
locally, then compulsory licenses would be available for other parties.
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Now, if-and there are many countries in which such a system would
exist-Now, if you tried to, as a pharmaceutical company, to manufacture
in all those countries, the price of pharmaceuticals would skyrocket. So that
is not really a proper solution. Now, we have seen that in India there was
up to-again, the 2002 law was a relatively strong law on copyrights. And
that helped fostering basically the really strong development of computer
science in India, in addition to excellent schools. Now, India has in the new
law, abolished the protection for this, and I'm just wondering what will
happen to the industry. But clearly the patent system or the copyright
system has helped their developing, the product, the industry.
Just a minute on Brazil and then I am closing. There were reports that
Brazil was using the compulsory license mechanism to make products
available, but it is not true. What the pharmaceutical companies have done,
and they are willing to do, is to supply drugs at the generic prices, which
has happened in the case of Brazil. Eighty percent of the needs of the
AIDS' patients was supplied by the pharmaceutical industry at very low
prices, and 20 percent was supplemented based on local manufacturers
because there was no patents.
I just want to give you one last example before I close. There are
efforts, for example, by Pfizer to make drugs available-I think it's
Citromax for the River Blindness in Africa, at very low prices, and that's a
project that has been very successful. In summary, I don't think the patent
system is the culprit. That's my [opinion].
MR. BARTON: Thank you very much. Our final two presentations
are more about how to do it. Let me start with Vernon Winters, a partner in
Weil, Gotsshal & Manges.
MR. WINTERS: Thanks very much. I wanted to talk today a bit
about, you know, we're here at a conference talking about patentability
generally and policy issues. I wanted to bring a real world focus to that and
talk about what it means to biotechnology companies to be able to secure a
patent. And I want to do that two ways. I want to take sort of a historical
look back and then a cautionary look forward. And the look back is going
to concern patents on gene sequences. And we all today take biotechnology
advances pretty much for granted. We read about them in the general press.
It's likely that people that you know or perhaps people in this room have
benefited from advances in biotechnology. It could have easily tipped the
other way. In the early 1980's, really at the birth of the industry, there was
a lot of concern both within the scientific community itself and the general
public at large, about what it meant to be able to take gene sequences from
one living organism and put them into another to make pretty muchgenerally the talk was about recombinant proteins. What did that mean?
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There were famous monsters in the sewers debates at Harvard about the
possibility of recombinantly engineered E. Coli could leave the laboratory
and create crocodiles in the sewers. I'm being a little facetious. There was a
lot of concern in both, as I said in both the scientific community and the
general community. And so what the scientific community did was hold,
some of you probably know about this, the famous Asilomar Conference, 7
where people, the scientific community, looked at the ethics, and the
scientific risks of being able to take gene sequences and use them to
program other organisms to produce proteins and called a moratorium on
all that work. There were also questions at that point about whether or not
gene sequences were patentable. That was far from clear under the U.S.
patent laws. How did that resolve? As we know, the scientific community,
working with itself with a lot of inputs from legislative people from
lawyers, from bioethists, which is, you know, a well accepted field now
was just at its infancy then, concluded that the risks were acceptable. And
in 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in and decided in the Diamond v.
8
Chakrabarty
case that living things were patentable, and that decision is
generally pointed to as the legal event that enabled companies to take out
patents on gene sequences.
So what happened since then? I would say it's largely an unqualified
success, at least here in the United States. The FDA has approved more
than 130 biotechnology drugs and vaccines, and those have helped more
than 350 million people worldwide. Here in the U.S., the biotechnology
outspends on a relative basis, other industries on R&D by sometimes
factors of two and three, and in 2001 alone, spent nearly $16 billion on
research and development. And in 1999, just within the U.S., the
biotechnology industry generated $47 billion in.revenues, created 440,000
jobs, spent $11 billion in research and development, and $11 billion in tax
revenues. Now, could any of that have happened without patent protection?
It's sort of hard to know, it's hard to create an alternate universe and run
that experiment. But I don't know many people who credibly advanced an
argument that it could have. If you talk with executives at biotech
companies, with researchers, with economists, the phrase that recurs over
and over and over again, is 'patents are the life blood of the biotech
industry.' You can find that quote from the CEO's of Biogenentec, Amgen,
all the major companies.
And, okay, why do patents necessarily enable biotech companies to
produce these drugs upon which we've all come to rely? Because the risk

7. For more information, see http://amwancal.org/Asilomarconf.htm.
8. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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reward ratio to try to produce a new biotech drug is very high. It's been
estimated-there's a center at Tuft's University that studies this industry
pretty closely. The recent estimates are that it takes $802 million and 10 to
15 years to go from start through FDA approval to get that first drug into a
patient. Biopharmaceutical products have enormous failure rates. It's been
estimated that for every 5,000 medicines tested on average only five reach
clinical trials. And the FDA approves of those five only one for patient use.
So that's the look back and here's the sort of cautionary look forward.
We're at the preface here in this country of another potential biotech
revolution, and I'm talking about stem cell technology. Probably people in
this room are aware of what's been written about its promise. And you can
only call it that. It's absolutely in its infancy. But there is debate now about
whether or not stem cells ought to be patentable, whether or not we ought
to be investing in it here in this country. And the real world effect of those
sorts of impediments to patentability and research are that that key
technology is now going elsewhere. So, for example, Singapore has
recently invested nearly $2 billion in infrastructure and personnel to try to
make it one of the key stem cell centers in the world. Roger Peterson, one
of the leading stem cell researchers here in the U.S., recently moved his
laboratory over to the UK because of the climate here. And I don't have an
answer. I'm not suggesting an answer here. But by concluding that certain
technology should be beyond the reach of patents or that certain technology
should be beyond the reach of what we should be investing in, we're
making real world choices about where those developments are going to
occur, and in my judgment, if they're going to occur. Thank you.
MR. BARTON: Thank you. And our last panelist is Don Francis,
President and co-founder of Vaxgen.
MR. FRANCIS: Thank you, John. I would actually like to get down
to the nitty gritty of doing and using our experience with trying to make a
company initially, solely on the pursuit of an AIDS vaccine to show the
examples you have to deal with both intellectual property and the
challenges of the whole world process. I think the issue for biotechnology
is here we have the possibility in modem biotechnology to make vaccines
for dangerous agents, like HIV, that can indeed approach the whole world.
So from the beginning there we're taking modem biotechnology and
thinking about vaccines for the entire world from the founding of our
company onwards. And a lot of that dealt with the issue of what side this
private public partnership can get the job done. And I, as someone who was
in the government for 21 years, realized that it was really only industry that
could do it, and so retired and tried to see if you could do it from industry.
Well, industry has a hard time, too, actually in the vaccine business. And
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I'll get to that in a bit. But by and large vaccines don't compete very well in
a structure that we have where, as John mentioned, all the profit comes
from the industrialized world, where as by and large a lot of these diseases
are in the less developed parts of the world. But HIV is unique, unique in
several ways. One, it's unique in that here, we drove the founding of this
company, understanding that there was a high incidence of the disease in
the industrialized world and a need for a vaccine, and there was huge
incidence in the less developed parts of the world, and there should be
some way to balance that. And so; as was mentioned, you have to talk
about hundreds of millions of dollars. We spun off of Genentec, Genentec
put about $50 million into this vaccine and we have raised $130 million
just for the development and another $100 million for manufacture. So,
you're getting into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and you don't know
if a vaccine works. And indeed we've had our first trial that has been a
relative failure. We still have some clues that may lead us onto a vaccine,
but another $100's of million are going to be required to actually move that
forward. What's interesting is I've seen other companies deal with AIDS
vaccines in a quote that I will not give a name to, but there's only a few
companies working on AIDS vaccines in a large sense around the world,
and one of the largest companies that's working on it, a very high level
individual in that company recently told me that the whole staff of the
company just prays the vaccine is not successful because of the tiger by the
tail issue one will have with an AIDS vaccine.
So, in an opportunity costs situation, the reason that we spun Vaxgen
out of Genentec in the first place was that within a pharmaceutical
company, vaccines don't compete. If you think-if I think about this back
in the early days of AIDS and the discovery of the virus, I thought a
vaccine would be available far before I thought an antiviral would be
available, because antivirals are really tough, especially with little agents
like viruses, where there aren't very many targets. And yet, there's a dozen
or more antivirals out there on the market and there's not one vaccine. And
that's really an issue of how much resource has been put in. That was a
very hard challenge to get antivirals. And so, within the-looking at the
public [and] private side of this, the public side can't do it and the private
side is not very interested in doing it. So you have a difficult issue, that
frankly is not centered around intellectual property. We have huge
intellectual property that protects us should we have a vaccine, but an awful
lot of that is know how, and this is a tough product to make, and it's just
not going to be stolen here and there. The issues that I see if we have a
successful vaccine ultimately, is how we're going to take a relatively
expensive vaccine-It really is in the dollar sense, not in the hundreds of
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dollar sense, but in vaccines that's about a log higher than is usually
expected-and get that delivered, and how to do it inexpensively and get
the return on the investment. But I think that can be dealt with, in John's
words, at tiered pricing. With an AIDS vaccine, I still think there is a
market, but again, relative to other products, there is not a market and
therefore, there aren't too many companies interested in it.
Let me quickly deal with some of the reality where the tire meets the
road issues, just for this, and that is-looking at the early parts of the
studies [to understand] what we were confronted with. First of all, it's hard
to do in the developing world, because you needed a really a considerable
infrastructure to have a well-managed, large-scaled trial of thousands of
people. And fortunately, the World Health Organizations set up of a variety
of places, only one of which was actually functioning by the time we
started out in Bangkok, Thailand. They really had the capability, with a
certain amount of training and FDA-type regulatory oversight, to actually
do a trial very effectively. But it is a challenge to go to the third world and
do these large trials. And since this virus seems to vary in different parts of
the world, you really have to design your vaccine for that part of the world
and do the studies there.
Next, what was interesting in a legal sense was the regulatory/ethical
overview of the trials, in that there are different rules in different places.
And so when we were combining U.S. rules and Thai rules, you end up
having double duty with regulatory approval. And indeed the Thai trial was
supposed to start before the North American European trial and it started
later. Since this part of the world is very accustomed to the regulatory
approval of research, that part of the world isn't necessarily, and when you
go through setting up new committees, and going through the committees
for the first time, it was a bit of a challenge.
The other thing that was interesting in a legal sense is the desire for
the developing world to have a piece of the action for your vaccine and
have a promise of reduced pricing, etc. before you even know whether you
have a product, and how do you do that with a start-up company that
doesn't know what the outcome is? And how can you deal with that issue
when you don't know what the prices, what the realities are, except giving
nice words? And fortunately, the countries we've worked with have been
able to be satisfied with that.
And then finally is the issue of actual supply of the product when
you've finished, not only the price of it, but how you're going to deal with
the priorities. Think about a small company like ours and we do have a
successful product, that is equally successful in the developing country
versus the industrialized world, and the profits that one can get from the
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industrialized world would just be massive, especially when your capacity
is limited for manufacturing as it is early on. You'll be in a very tight
situation with a huge public health need in your less return side, and your
high return side having less public health need but getting the return to get
your company to survive.
Finally, let me just end with the issue of why we have this discordant
situation fee between vaccines and therapies and the opportunity cost
conflict that you have at Genentec or anywhere else. And it's really a line
of social value. Frankly, our societies are not-world societies are not
mature enough to value prevention in general, and therefore, even though
everyone gives very nice lip service to something like an AIDS vaccine, the
immense need that anyone in this room would come up within five minutes
of a review of having an AIDS vaccine, it does not compete and so you
have no vaccine for AIDS and a dozen therapies out there that are equally
hard technologically to make. So the lack of social value leads to a lack of
industry interest. And it's not a issue of legal or intellectual property. It's
really just a basic issue of economics. As long as the world does not value
such things as prevention and long-term cost reduction, we just won't have
the biotechnology industry getting into the field even though the power is
immense now. Thank you.
MR. BARTON: Terrific. Thank you. And thank all five of you for
getting us off to a good start. I'm going to exercise the moderator's
prerogative of asking a first question or two. And let me aim my first
question at Mr. Winters, and at anybody else who would like to respond to
it.
Pharmaceuticals are the highest growing component of health care
costs in the United States. Pharmaceutical prices are increasing more
rapidly than any other product. A large percentage of this is being placed in
the form of price tensions and health care systems and HMO's and on
employers. The fair chunk of it is being bought by the government. We're
considering a program of government purchase of pharmaceuticals for the
aged. I cannot imagine that that will not be soon followed by price controls.
Is the pattern that you've described going to last? How are we going to
resolve this increasing tension between prices and a system which has
served us wonderfully, of course, a system based on patents? What do you
see as the future? And I'd love to hear comments from any others as well.
MR. WINTERS: Anybody else want to go first because that is a big
question?
(LAUGHTER)
MR. WINTERS: I don't know the answer. I don't have an answer
necessarily. I mean, there are some immutable facts here. One is that, and
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we've hear from first hand that this is true, that trying to create these
medicines is a very high risk, huge expense reward. And that is why,
frankly, countries in the developed world are the leaders in creating them.
It's because we're the ones who have the capital to do the investment, and
part of the reason we have the capital to do that investment in the biotech
context is because this country is the leading biotech country in the world.
And the successes we had early on are the things that are funding the
success now, and this institution is not exempt from that. As you probably
know the Cohen-Boyer Patent, 9 one the great early biotech patents, I think
the published figures are that that contributed something like $200 million
to Stanford. I might have that wrong, but I think that's right.
MR. BARTON: I think it's 150 or roughly. First of all, you're
absolutely right. It's a very difficult question. Is it a question that is real or
am I having a misperception seeing this as an important issue?
MR. WINTERS: No, that's absolutely right. It's a valid question.
It's, in my judgment, the biopharmaceutical industry has badly managed
their response to that question on a public relations front, on an economic
front. I'd love to hear what some of my colleagues think the answers might
be.
MR. MAURER: I don't have an answer, but certainly when I sit
around a panel like this with other biotech physicians and executives, it's
interesting that our focus is worldwide and so we deal with international
issues. Most of them say, we're only interested in the U.S. market, maybe
Europe, because that's the only place we get our return. And they haven't
even thought about moving it on to the less profitable side because when
you have these, with that $800 million per drug develop, I think that is
correct, because five of them fail. So if ours is correct then ours is a $200
million process to find out whether it works or not. And you have to spend
a billion dollars to get one success. So, 800 is not far off. But you need a lot
of money. I saw the other day about-remember Chryslers' bailout by the
U.S. Government where they put that money into a redesign of a new
product, which was the minivan, and that was only a few hundred million
dollars, which is about what we pay for one drug development, and look
what that did. So, in a relative sense, this is a lot of money, and without a
high return, you're not going to get that kind of investment. Now, can you
do it cheaper? Will you get the same returns? Who knows if it's going to
continue to be this expensive. But a lot of the expense comes in ultimately
the phase three trials, which aren't going to change very much. You have
large numbers of individuals. It takes hundreds of million dollars to get the
9. U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (issued Dec. 2, 1980).
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final results of the study. Those aren't going to change very much. So
maybe the research can be done cheaper but, seems like with regular-the
way we do these trials is so compulsive and so it may be overdone, and it is
expensive.
MR. SIKKA: But if I may add, there are countries which are
economically poor but intellectually very rich. I would-in India and the
kind of progress India has made within and created virtually not a
phenomenal amount of results out of nothing. If more focus is given to
these countries, perhaps they'll be able to come out with phenomenal
solutions at low costs. There has to be a side-by-side balance. Let there be
competition. Let our intellectually rich country produce something with a
limited number of funds, which is not happening right now.
DR. VON MORZE: Perhaps if I could comment on the issue, as far
as the developing countries are concerned. Of course, one cannot even put
the United States and Europe in one pot because you have much more price
control in Europe and governmental price control. And let me just give you
one example that, of course, pharmaceutical companies are somewhat
frustrated about because, of course, it affects immediately the return on
investment. For example, it may take as long, you may get your product
approved, but to get on the health reimbursement scheme, it may take as
long as two years, because the price that you are trying to get based on the
research investment does not suit the health authorities. And, you know,
that's why it's a very difficult question but it's even multifaceted in the
developing world. But, you know, I would imagine that there would be
eventually, although companies wouldn't like it, there would be some sort
of price control even in the United States eventually. You know, that's
something that's probably, I mean to a certain extent, it's happening that
you have certain lists in hospitals that you need to get on these lists, and
many products won't make it on those lists because they're too expensive.
And there are maybe alternatives available, therapeutic alternatives
available.
MR. WINTERS: To some extent, the future's already here, because
the other thing that brings down prices is buying power on the buyer's side.
And monopsony is very large in the United States and as soon as you get
outside the United States, the price differentials between drugs here and in
Europe are often 50 percent or more. And we talked about incentives this
morning where you go to a Canadian policy conference, they're quite
honest about saying, look we export very little innovation to the rest of the
world. We import a lot of drugs and we understand our best interest. So we
may not have so far to fall to John's world because there are a lot of market
imperfections, even in the states, which means that the price of drugs is sort
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of set by arm wrestling rather than by a blind impartial market.
MR. BARTON: Let me hit you with one more hard question and then
ask you to be the starting person. You suggested, you know we have to find
a subsidy to hide things in a way that's hidden from Congress. And I'm not
sure we have to hide it from Congress, but I agree completely. I mean,
there will need to be a subsidy, and the question is, do you in essence pay it
through the international development community, through international
health systems, through pharmaceutical companies, with differential
pricing, asking them to give up possible economic grants in developing
countries? Clearly the question is, where do you find that subsidy? But I
want to ask-and I don't know the answer to that? It's a political question.
But I wanted to ask sort of a more practical question, given the group we
have here in particular. Is it better to put that subsidy at the front end in
terms of what is a moving NIH or something like NIH, further forward in
the development process, or is it better to put it backend, in terms of saying,
if you private sector come up with something, we'll make sure that we pay
you a price that's high enough to cover your R&D costs. And I guess I'd
like to hear some thoughts on that before we open it up?
MR. MAURER: I guess my two thoughts about that is that there's a
very powerful example from the post war. We've just talked about vaccines
and that they're everybody's poor relation. We do things differently in the
postwar. It was largely people like March of Dimes and also to a smaller
extent the federal government in those days, March of Dimes was actually
bigger than the federal government in vaccines, and it was developed
publicly. And then it was produced by the companies without intellectual
property rights but with sort of oligopoly advantages, that I know how to
make the stuff and nobody else does, so you can get some price out of that
even without a patent. But that was a world where basically, you turned the
National Labs loose on it in modern language. And I had talked to people
in National Labs over the last week or so about this question and they sort
of say, boy, wouldn't that be a great thing that we could be in that
business? I think the real question about the advantages of IP is that we'll
be more expensive in dollar terms because you have this monopoly pricing.
And the question is, will we drill more dry holes than in a world where the
government drills the dry holes? In other words, is there something about
IP that elicits information that isn't public, that we need to avoid this dry
hole, and that the private sector will avoid that better? Because both sectors
will drill dry holes. The question is, are you going to get into a pathology
where the government guy needs to go to work every day and so he doesn't
quite say, you know, I think this will be a dry hole, but hey, I'm going to
drill it anyway for a couple of years? I've got grant money. Those are the
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kinds of things we need to worry about in incentives. But the absolute
cheapest way to do this is to hire it done directly without the IP incentive. I
think that's pretty clear. The question is will we end up with these
information pathologies that the private sector does it better?
One last thing, if you look at how the National Labs were born, with
this tremendous inventiveness in the Second World War, where people
came out of academia, they had a great cause, they participated in it. I'm
not of that generation, but I can say when I talk to National Labs people
about a malaria vaccine, their eyes light up the same way. I mean, I think
they want to roll up their sleeves and do this. This could be the great good
thing of our generation.
MR. WINTERS: Having been on both sides of both the government
and the private sector, I think it's really an issue of people and the measure
of outcome. And there is no organization right now in the government in
this by and large that develops. As you point out, the dry hole for an act of
academic is not to bad. That is if you, you actually-if your output is
publishing manuscripts then dry holes or wet holes are expected to be more
important. You might get a better journal but you still get a number of
manuscripts compared to a product out. It's a very different philosophy.
And we've done both in AIDS vaccine, worked closely with the
government, abandoned working the government, probably back in
working with the government. It is not as easy, as long as the government
forces, really you're coming out of the National Institutes of Health which
are research organizations,

. . .

not product development organizations. It's

very different from the March of Dimes, which got a bunch of academic
folks together and said, let's make a vaccine. And it was make a vaccine. It
was not make a manuscript. And it depends on how you measure the output
and currently it's not terribly effective, at least not in the vaccine field, that
I see.
DR. VON MORZE: There's one comment that, you know, about dry
holes is one aspect of it. But the problem that also the government centered
development would have is eventually they will have to contract with
pharmaceutical companies because the marketing, the development of the
market, and exploitation on the market side, I don't think this could work
through the government. I mean, that has to be done through the industry.
MR. WINTERS: I would like to make one more point. Things have
really changed. It depends on what the government's priority is. You would
think the government priority would be very high in developing an AIDS
vaccine, and it was not. You can read the book "Big Shot" 10 if you want to
10. PATRICIA THOMAS, BIG SHOT: PASSION, POLITICS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AN AIDS
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get the [gist] on the AIDS vaccine; there was a very good review of it. But
recently-we're the U.S. contractor for the anthrax vaccine, and when the
government wants to make an end, will make a vaccine and develop a
vaccine. Totally different. And, if we are successful it will probably be a
total record in terms of making a vaccine with speed and resources. So if
they want to develop something, in a militaristic fashion-you know, how
five people died of anthrax, and boy, the pressure to make an anthrax
vaccine [became] huge. That's about three and a half seconds of people in
AIDS, but, per day, every three seconds. But it still is a-if the government
really wants to do something and do it properly, and you've got right now
former military medical general saying, you make it, "bub" and it's
functioning and it's fascinating. But it's also a small group of people doing
it. It's not a big thing yet to them. They meet every week and beat us up
and we beat them up and get it done. So it's very interesting how you can
get it done, much like the March of Dimes, but the conflict and the politics
of, yes, it will work or no, it will work with something like AIDS and
academia was a disaster. But the same thing happened with polio where
Jonas Salk said he had a vaccine, Albert Sable said, no you don't, and
finally the March of Dimes said we'll fund both of you, and go for it. And
thank goodness it did.
DR. VON MORZE: That would be also a different scenario because
there would be immediate market acceptance. It's not something that you
have to promote and go through sophistication.
MR. BARTON: Let me open it up for questions from the [audience],
I noticed that there were a couple of hands earlier. Sure.
AUDIENCE: This is more of an international angle of it. To what
extent has the various infrastructures [talked] to each other so that at least
we avoid the duplication effort and the eventual transfer of these costs to
the consumer? I'm having, regardless of the fact that it has been said that in
the area of AIDS there are various problems that strains, that they call it,
there are various strains. So maybe one is working on these strains and they
don't have the results that many in sub-Sahara Africa may want. I mean
those are two related issues. Thank you.
MR. FRANCIS: Certainly a cartoon that the AIDS drug is going to
have spillovers if we make one for the United States that it will have
spillovers to sub-Saharan Africa. They are different. So these are sort of
artificial distinctions to some extent. I do think, and there are people a lot
better qualified than me on the panel, that there will be considerable
learning. If you can make one for the West, you'll probably learn an awful
VACCINE (Public Affairs 2001).
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lot about where to drill the next hole when you do the sub-Saharan version.
MR. MAURER: I think there is lots of communication but the
amount of money going in it is actually, it is trivial. I-if you look at the
balance of sub-Saharan Africa as far as need for an AIDS vaccine versus
the United States and Europe, the balance is absolutely skewed. But
actually how much work is being done for an African vaccine, there is a
little bit, but it is trivial compared to the economic and personal impact. It's
terribly out of balance. And I think prevention tends to be out of balance
for therapy as I mentioned earlier. But this is an example without compare.
AUDIENCE: INAUDIBLE
MR. BARTON: Wait a moment so we can get the loud speaker,
please.
AUDIENCE: John, you started out with the first question with
pharmaceuticals being the fastest growing segment of health care costs.
That's the costs side of it, but can you also consider the benefit side of it?
Because of the pharmaceuticals we've got better quality of life that
increased life span and quality. So does the cost justify the benefits?
MR. BARTON: I think the question is evaluating how good the
pharmaceuticals that come out are, and how they compare with alternate
things that we might be developing? I think there is certainly a set of risks
associated in part with what kinds of products have the best market. And I
think I'd appreciate other thoughts on this. I have my best market for a
product that people take every day as opposed to a product that they take
once in their life. There are set of risks for that type, which, of course, cuts
against preventive therapies. There is also a set of risks associated with the
tort liability system, which says, something which you give to somebody
getting old involves much less potential liability risks than something that
you give to somebody who's a child, or worst of all a pregnant woman.
Therefore, I think we see a significant set of legal system based skewing in
the focus of research. And I think I want to know the answer to that better
than I actually do, about how much skewing actually occurs. But those
would be my hypotheses and my suspicions.
MR. BARTON: Other people?
AUDIENCE: My question is for Mr. Sikka. To what extent-you
mentioned that many people are unable to afford drugs in developing
countries. To what extent is that among lay people viewed as the fault of
the U.S. or something being imposed on them by the U.S. or do they blame
their own governments? And then if so, do those governments sort of try to
pass the buck and say well this is because of the international property
regime put onto us by the U.S? Essentially my question is, how much sort
of ill will are we gathering up as this continues among lay people who
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haven't studied TRIPS, etc.?
MR. SIKKA: Well, there's no ill will per se, if that is your focus.
Second, like India, we, in the 80's, we were denied super computers. We
somehow managed about $35 to $40 million and produced a super
computer product within three years, and it matches the best. We are in this
no-win situation today. When I was in Geneva last December, one of the
ambassadors of the developing countries came out after the U.S. blocked
the TRIPS, and he said we are all in a comma. We still believe we are just
at a comma. It's a matter of how you take a pause now and then go on to
write sentences and chapters and paragraphs. There's always a way to go
about it. There's no ill will. For sure, developing countries will always
come up with something. It may not be the best, but we will-they'll be
able to meet their requirements.
MR. MAURER: But for you who have not been to the developing
world looking at health care, and it's not uncommon for a country in the
less developed countries to have what three, four, five, six, eight dollars per
year per person for health care, whereas we're running what, about $4,000
now in the United States. So when you talk about new biotech drugs that
are expensive to develop, what was described in the clever ingenuity of
India no doubt, to make drugs there, not to mention super computers. But
there's not the economic hit necessarily to be able to purchase them once
you get them out.
MR. SIKKA: Just to add to it, say Kenya spends about $20 odd per
year on health care. Norway spends over $2,000 per head. I'm perhaps
mistaken it's much more. You cannot overnight make out a law and then
compare Kenya versus Norway. I know there has to be a buffer zone and if
we are not going to allow that buffer zone to take shape, initially there will
be a little bit and things will come out. There's always a nature of concern.
AUDIENCE: We were talking about the high cost of developing
medicines, something like $800 million to bring a drug to market, and we
talked about the reason that it's so because the costs associated with trials
so high, probably because our government is so risk adverse in bringing
those new drugs to market. Is it possible to-is it possible for companies to
run trials in developing countries where clearly the cost of running the trial
would be much, much lower, for marketing the drug in that country? And,
if so, does that represent a reasonable strategy to bring new medicines to
developing countries first, at a far cheaper price, while it's struggling
through the ten years of regulatory approval in the United States-I'd just
like to hear a comment to that.
MR. MAURER: We're doing our first retrial in Thailand but in terms
of the return, you're going to get a lot less, but we're doing this for not only
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making worldwide vaccine development and taking different strains where
you have to do it there. There's a lot of work done in the developing world,
but is that the market that's going to drive this multimillion-dollar return?
As I've mentioned before, the panels I've sat on with other folks say that
we're interested in the United States and that's all. At $4,000 a year per
person, you can see why. So you can do the trials there, yeah, but then you
really have an ethical situation. You do the trial there and then not supply
the drug?
DR. VON MORZE: Perhaps the other point I want to make is this.
As I mentioned in my remarks, it's very difficult to do clinical trials in
some of the developing countries, because, I mean, the infrastructure is not
set up. You will be probably the first trial ever done in a country where the
need for this essential medicine exists. But what I can say is this, I know,
having worked in a pharmaceutical companies and still in contact with
pharmaceutical companies, it is happening to a large extent, for example,
with countries in the former Eastern Block countries, you know, Slovokia,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, because-and even Russia. There
are actually quite experienced physicians there to run clinical trials at a
substantially reduced cost. So it's-and that is happening. But the key is
also, you cannot have data that you could not submit to the FDA. You have
to have, you know, the same standards [so] that these data are useable also
for FDA or Europe. But this is happening, you know.
MR. BARTON: May I ask a couple of follow up questions to that?
First of all, I know there's an international conference on harmonization,
which is at the very-I mean, obviously it's not harmonizing product
approval standards, but is at the very least seeking to design things so that I
can take a study in one country and submit it as part of my package in
another country. Is that really working and is that going to be useful, you
know, with the possibilities of doing studies in Thailand and in Eastern
Europe?
DR. VON MORZE: I really lack the expertise to answer the
question.
MR. MAURER: Doing high quality studies, it's just-it can be done
anywhere in the world if you have the right, as you mentioned, having the
right researchers. There are talented people everywhere. And even the, in
the poorest of sub-Saharan Africa, I'm sure we can find, and indeed are
talking to, people who can do outstanding research. Now, some of the
issues for therapeutic drugs and the diagnostics and such, you need, you
have to put that all in place. It can be done. There's no doubt about it. And
the harmonization, what is happening is that Europe and FDA are setting
these standards. And there-let me just back up. The reason that these
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standards are so high is because the assumption is the pharmaceutical
researchers are cheating. Because you have huge economic advantages to
cheat on your studies to make them look good. And so the rigor that you
have to do to them that insures that when the FDA comes in they can drill
all the way down to the European, or whatever authority, comes down, they
can drill all the way down into your data base and see that you did not
cheat, is much more expensive research than just doing assumed honest
research. I think it's reasonable because I think people will cheat to because
the economic advantage is high

....

but I think those standards can be

done anywhere in the world.
AUDIENCE: I wanted to ask you about the cost benefit analysis that
we structure in the United States, where both the profits that a firm obtains
through its IP and the negative aspects of risk, primarily through litigation
that we've seen since 1980, so that very formidable pharmaceutical firms
that have helped people for over a century suddenly go out of business
when a single drug has a negative outcome. And contrast that to the
developing world, for instance in India, where they still use
chloramphenicol 1' because the drug is a very useful drug. It's very
important. It saves lives. But we can no longer value the saving of a life
individually versus the group. How do you respond to that?
MR. MAURER: Well, I hate to speak against litigation in these
hallowed halls. And I think litigation does drive some honesty. It can
obviously go to the extreme, but it does drive one to, if one is doing bad
things, at least, to cover it up better. But(LAUGHTER)
MR. MAURER: But there are some things unique to the vaccine
industry. We cannot survive in the vaccine industry with just wild litigation
because if you immunize everyone in this room, somebody will get sick,
unfortunately, in the coming months, and if they blame it on the vaccine,
they'll then sue you. And that's been a horrible, and that drove the vaccine
industry essentially out of business, almost and totally out of business in
the United States down to just a handful. And we have an expert on this
next to us. But it's a real-that kind of litigation-for anything you give to
healthy young people is a problem. Because one, they're young and they'll
live a long time and plus some of them are not going to be healthy no
11. Chloramphenicol is a toxic antibiotic which may cause serious side effects. These
include blood dyscrasias such as aplastic anemia, hypoplastic anemia, thrombocytopenia and
granulocytopenia. Headache, mild depression, mental confusion and delirium have also been
described in patients receiving chloramphenicol. Chloramphenicol is rarely used, and its purpose
is to treat typhoid fever, some forms of meningitis, spotted fever and typhus. See
http://www.healthcentral.com/mhc/top/001740.cfm.
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matter what you do. We have, we've given our vaccine to about 3,000
people and we've had somewhere in the neighborhood of 50 deaths in that
period of time. Now luckily we have a vaccine and placebo trial so that you
can look at the number of deaths in the vaccine group and the placebo
group and see there's no interest, I mean, there's no increase. And a lot of
these are driving their motorcycle into hard objects but you could say that
the vaccine made you dizzy and therefore you drove your motorcycle into a
hard object. And it can be terribly expensive to try to defend. And the sad
thing is, there are little kids who get autism or whatever else, and it's
driven the vaccine industry crazy with litigation. So now we have a system
to deal with that and I think it's doing relatively well. But we could not,
literally could not, even think about marketing an AIDS vaccine without
some sort of intermediate steps to protect against random litigation. Now,
not-now, negligent litigation, I think that it's perfectly appropriate. But
the non-negligent liability associated with giving healthy people things,
birth control pills, anything you give to healthy people, some of them are
going to become unhealthy and you're going to get blamed for it.
MR. BARTON: Did you want to comment on the safety approval
process in India and also whether you have litigation worries there?
MR. SIKKA: The-most of the world outside does not understand
quite clearly what India goes through. One billion people, 80 percent of
them unable to afford [insurance and there is] no kind of insurance
infrastructure. And let's talk about the approval systems that we have there.
Anything and everything was going on and sometimes we believe that it
still goes on. But over a period, the structure has improved. We've not
only, engineers are working day and night and coming out intelligent
companies which are now producing results. Pharmaceutical companies
themselves are fighting tooth and nail and making sure that if somebody
thoughts lose and stuff, they are taken to task. We are personally fighting
an Amgen case in India, on a matter, and taking on a major company,
pharmaceutical company, and we believe that it was not approved by the
drug authorities in the manner in which should have been. So those systems
are taking shape at a rapid pace. There are not much to satisfaction and it
will take us time to do that. They are coming of age as of now.
AUDIENCE: Any one of you that can answer this. I'm interested in
knowing a little bit about the role of generic drug companies in the United
States and I was wondering if any of you can speak to generic companies'
success or perhaps failure in bringing low cost drugs to market and perhaps
to developing countries.
MR. BARTON: Let me start with that one and then give my
colleagues a chance to respond. Sort of by definition the generic industry
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doesn't bring new products to market. In other words, the fundamental
definition of generic-the fundamental concept of the Hatch Waxman
Act, 12 and I'm interested and wondering whether it's under political tension
as well. But the fundamental concept of the Hatch Waxman Act is we have
sort of a brand-name, research based pharmaceutical industry, that has
patent protection, and that at some point, when the patent ends, and there's
all kinds of legal games and complications about exactly when you lose
your exclusivity, infinitely complex statutory interpretation problems. But
when you get past that point, then generic competition can enter upon
showing that the product is biologically equivalent to the product that is
already on the market rather than upon showing the enormous zillion dollar
tests that are needed to show that the product is effective. Therefore, the
generic industry is available as a way to produce existing products. And
one of the real issues in this global balance is the extent to which generic
companies, traditionally in India, should be competing with brand name
pharmaceutical companies, in let us say, South Africa, or something of that
type. That's one of the points of political tension. And in this sense, there is
an Indian generic industry which is based on the fact that patents-product
patents haven't been applicable in India. Those product patents will
become applicable in India in 2005. And at that point, what happens to
Indian generic industry is a very interesting question, and I'd love to hear
some thoughts on it. But I can look to those people to provide me cheap,
competitive priced copies of existing drugs under a bargain in which we
reward the company that brings the product to market, but then at some
point, let the price drop through the generic competition. And that's the
precise bargain of the Hatch Waxman Act of what, 1984? '82?
MR. MAURER: 1984. As subsequently amended many times.
MR. BARTON: And I guess I'd like a little bit more from my
colleagues on that.
AUDIENCE: Will you speak into a microphone, please?
DR. VON MORZE: I'm sorry. Yes. The problem is not only that
there are no new products, but there's such a huge price differential
between the less generic price-yes, even the Canadian generic price,
which is much lower, that would not really be helpful for the developing
countries because it's just not, you know, only a company like India or
other countries could produce at a much lower price, the generic product.
But definitely, it's not happening in Canada. It's very difficult to imagine.
MR. SIKKA: Let me add some interesting scenario to this. Over 80
12. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) ["Hatch Waxman Act"].
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percent of the drugs today are likely to be in the next couple of years going
to be off patent. Of late, in the past three or four years, Indian companies
have started coming into America and started to enter into the generic
business. When President Clinton visited India, we, my company, was
invited to make a special presentation to him, and we explained to him how
American medicine bill can be brought down by 10 fold, 10 times. And we
gave a rational behind it. We explained it to' him that without
compromising on anything, quality and stuff, the total bill can be brought
down. The problem is that too many guys know about it. They're going
away. It will take time, and this is perhaps one of the fears of these
multinationals, that they fear we're going to come in and barge into their
market. It's not really that. It is happening at a slow pace, and perhaps the
next ten years are going to be very interesting. The aim of the developing
countries is to bring down the prices down because that's their own need.
And generic does not cost much. We're insisting on the developing
countries must be allowed to come up with pro-competitive solutions and
that is where the solution lies.
MR. WINTERS: Some of the technology, I don't know, if you took
the small molecule market, not the biotech stuff, took the small molecule
market, a huge amount of the drugs that we use here, at least the beginning
materials for them, if not the final product, are made outside the United
States now. Truly the drug industry is a global industry no matter how you
look at it.
MR. BARTON: It's not in India, if I understand it.
MR. WINTERS: Yeah, India and Singapore, and China.
DR. VON MORZE: China, yeah.
MR. SIKKA: Brazil.
MR. WINTERS: Brazil.
MR. BARTON: Then we'll give you the next chance so you don't
have to run.
AUDIENCE: I was wondering if the panel could comment on the
proper role of TRIPS compulsory licensing, and if Mr. Sikka could
comment on what he perceives that the limits will oppose on India in 2005,
and maybe even India's-is India being a strong generic industry, it's role
in sort of compulsory licensing exporting necessary drugs to the least
developing countries.
MR. SIKKA: Well, if Professor Barton allows me, I'll take it in a
lighter vein and we've become a little too serious. In our country there is a
fear about TRIPS. Perhaps, perhaps I can send a message. There is a tribe
in India which is known for its ferocity. They are very aggressive. They
remain a part of our Northern Block. And they do not deal with the major
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force that allowed, they kept Moguls at bay. At one point they occupied a
particular land and said that it belongs to them. And government realized
that there is no point in pushing them. They'll not listen to anything. And
they said, okay this land is yours. You have to come up with two crops.
That night they all celebrated and took a lot of liquor and decided the first
crop would be sugar cane. One old man from this warrior tribe got up and
said, if for the neighboring village picks up and steals your crop what will
happen? They said okay, let's sort out the neighbor first. So they went lock,
stock and barrel and hammered the neighbor's house, and the neighbors try
to ask what have we done? Dare you steal our sugar cane?
(LAUGHTER)
MR. SIKKA: TRIPS fear of developed countries, I think, is
unfounded. Let it come into place. There's miles to go still.
MR. FRANCIS: I think it may be even a little more hopeful than
that. The Bush administration in December said that India could export
generics to India-I'm sorry-to South Africa, and we would not object
under TRIPS. Under TRIPS you need to be a state to object. And there's
actually a history at this point that the Clinton administration had a
previous executive order about the interpretation of compulsory licenses.
So, I mean there is a sense in which the developed countries have said in
very explicitly, or at least the American government has, we're not going to
push this joke to its natural limits. There is a little bit of evidence that
public pressure can shape how TRIPS actually emerges.
MR. BARTON: Let me add a little bit to that. First of all,
compulsory licensing almost never happens. And its main role is not to
happen. Its main role is to be a bargaining chip to encourage a price
concession. I think there's no question about that.
MR. SIKKA: Absolutely.
MR. BARTON: And the pharmaceutical industry is under the
political pressure of the last several years, had moved towards very
substantial donations and so forth of products for sub-Sahara Africa. I think
it's clear these are nowhere near enough to satisfy the supply. I think
there's a real question and this I think is one of the important issues for the
future about the sustainability of that kind of donation or strongly
discounted price arrangement on a voluntary basis. But the-so the
compulsory licensing provides its fundamental role in encouraging the
pharmaceutical industry to do that sort of thing.
In terms of debate over the details of TRIPS, the technical problem
ends up, what do I do when everybody has their patent systems, which
many of them are supposed to by 2005, and I don't have the Indian generic
industry? In other words, at this point, the Indian generic industry can
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supply products to sub-Sahara Africa even in countries where productswhere a product is not patented. Now, the realities as I understand it are,
this is actually only a small percent of the market because there are many
other real problems, including the health care and maintenance problems
and so forth that have already been described. This is one of several
problems in a series. But, that and the availability of that industry to do that
with products that are still on patent in the majority of the world will
change in 2005. And so we're going to have a very different world at that
point.
DR. VON MORZE: I comment on that point because the change
only applies to patent applications that will be filed in 2005, and from what
we heard about the research and development, it will take it to at least 2015
before-because you have to have a product that is being developed, that is
put on the market, and then it would be subject to a compulsory license
regime or some sort of regime. But it takes still quite a lot of time before
the change will be effective.
MR. BARTON: You had a question.
AUDIENCE: Thank you. A lot of these countries in the developing
world have large populations of people, so I presume that their incidence of
the disease would be higher. So my question is, that whenever you're
working on differential pricing and looking at return of investment, how
much of those higher incidences are taken into consideration?
MR. MAURER: I think everyone looks at the ultimate market and
depending on how much is purchased and at what cost. So yes, if you
can-and you get the return. Indeed, if you're looking at vaccines, we
certainly don't have to do much advertising in places like sub-Saharan
Africa for an AIDS vaccine. It's a matter of getting your eighteen wheeler
trucks loaded up and shipped off to the nearest airport or boat and shipped
off there. So, I think, yes, the tiered pricing that we discussed a little bit for
things like vaccines is straight forward. As a matter of fact, even in the
United States, vaccines are tiered priced to the pediatrician's office versus
the government, where you don't have any marketing issues. You just send
it off to a government warehouse. So, in that case, the situation that you
actually point out, you're selling a lot more product, yes, per unit cost is
less, but your profits can be substantial. What I'd mentioned before was
that especially when you don't-these kind of manufacturing plans are
very expensive to do. And so when you-early on, it's got difficulty-even
though your running it 24 hours a day, you get $5 a dose profit here, 50
cents a dose there. What's your board of directors going to say?
MR. BARTON: There's also a whole phenomenon of UNICEF and a
group of institutions working with it buying the vaccine products for
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distribution in the developing world. When you hear about the field day
campaigns of stopping the Civil War somewhere and trying to vaccinate
everybody under X years old, those are typically run by the international
donor community, and that community is usually able to get-no, the older
vaccines, of course. It's able to get those older vaccines, you know, on the
order of one percent of the price that my kids pay for their kids to have it.
And, this reflects buying power. It reflects taking advantage of surplus
capacity of vaccine manufacturers in Europe in order to try in essence to
get the price basically at marginal costs plus minuscule, meaning that the
capital costs of operating the production plants and building the production
plants, that all has to be borne by the parents of the children in the U.S. and
Europe.
AUDIENCE: Probably an undue able experiment, but I am just
wondering if tomorrow, if all patents are held invalid and there is no patent
regime in this country, what do you think would happen with all the
biotech companies? Would they all close up shop and go away?
MR. WINTERS: You would be raising money, for sure.
MR. MAURER: The existing large biotech companies have large
cash reserves and trade secrets upon which they can rely so they would
become smaller but probably still be viable. The industry as a whole, the
biotech industry, is just focusing on that narrowly, still loses money. So all
the start up companies would just go away. Because if you talk to venture
capitalists or executives from start up companies what you find is that what
the venture capitalists are interested in is patent protection. And they will
have due diligence teams that come and assess those patents and try to
determine whether or not the protection those patents confer justify the
investment. And the trade secret is sort of, there are people here with more
experience in this than me, but as I understand it, trivial for V.C. [venture
capital] investors. That would bring an end, in large part, to the biotech
industry. And that was one of the, the subtext of the remarks I gave. I think
there's a reasonable case that can be argued that without patent protection
for gene sequences here in this country, because as we've heard repeated a
number of times today, a lot of companies focus only on this market,
there's a credible case to be made that the biotech revolution would simply
not have happened.
MR. BARTON: Other questions?
UNKNOWN: I think we actually have to wrap up. If anybody has
any additional questions, maybe they can ask the panel members directly.
We really thank you all for coming.
MR. BARTON: Okay. Well, thank you.

